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1. Introduction 
 
After ten years of stability, the financial and economic crisis that followed the US subprime crisis 
and Lehman Brothers collapse highlighted the imbalances within the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) countries. These imbalances had probably been undervalued during the 
stability period when markets seemed to underestimate the possibility that governments might 
default. Nevertheless, from August 2007 onwards, in parallel with the rise in global financial 
instability that led to a “flight-to-quality”, yield spreads of euro area issues with respect to Germany 
spiraled (see Figure 1). Moreover, since 2010, Greece has been bailed out twice and the Republic of 
Ireland and Portugal also needed bailouts to stay afloat. These events brought to light the fact that 
the origin of sovereign debt crises in Europe could even go beyond the imbalances in public 
finances. 
 
Indeed, the main causes of the debt crises in Europe vary according to the country and reflect an 
important interconnexion between public and private debt. In Ireland, the crisis was mainly due to 
the private sector, particularly a domestic housing boom which was financed by foreign borrowers 
who did not require a risk premium related to the probability of default (see Lane, 2011). In Spain, 
since absorption exceeded production, the external debt grew and the real exchange rate 
appreciated, implying a loss of competitiveness for the economy. Unlike previous expansions, the 
resort to financing was not led by the public sector but by private households and firms. In contrast 
to Ireland and Spain, the origin of the debt crisis in Greece and Portugal was the structural deficit in 
the government sector. If the crisis spreads to Italy, this structural deficit would be the possible 
cause. Greece and Italy’s large fiscal deficit and huge public debt are the cumulative result of 
chronic macroeconomic imbalances1. However, the case of Portugal illustrates the importance of 
external debt2 (specifically, that of its private sector: banks and enterprises).  
 
                                                          
1 As pointed out in Gómez-Puig (2006 and 2008), in the past, Italy may have benefited from the fact that “size matters for liquidity” and 
thus for the success of a sovereign debt market since at the end of 2010 its market was the biggest in the euro area.  
2 The current account deficit over GDP was 9.86% in December 2010. 
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Some studies have already found a strong relationship between risk premium and a wide range of 
vulnerability indicators that go beyond the fiscal position. The IMF (2010) and Barrios et al. (2009) 
present empirical evidence of the strong relationship between current account deficits and foreign 
debt and the behavior of sovereign risk premium. Moreover, Gros (2011) contends that foreign 
debt is more important than public debt, and that this may have a number of implications for the 
ongoing eurozone crisis3.  
 
Other authors (Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Allen et al. (2011)), have focused on the study of 
cross-border banking system linkages to the government sector. Although, cross-border banking 
effect on risk diversification is a key benefit, foreign capital is likely to be more mobile than 
domestic capital and, in a crisis situation, foreign banks may simply decide to “cut and run”. In 
addition, in an integrated banking system, financial or sovereign crisis in a country can quickly spill 
over to other countries. In this context, it is important to note that the European Union and, 
especially the euro area, witnessed a significant increase in cross-border financial activity over the 10 
years before the global crisis (see Barnes, Lane and Radziwill, 2010). Both the elimination of 
currency risk and regulatory convergence4 can explain this important increase (see Kalemli-Ozcan, 
Papaioannou and Peydró-Alcalde, 2009). Spiegel (2009a and 2009b) shows that the effect of the 
monetary union has been even stronger for some of the peripheral EMU countries. In particular, 
the sources of external financing for Portuguese and Greek banks radically shifted on joining the 
euro; traditionally reliant on dollar debt, these banks were subsequently able to raise funds from 
their counterparts elsewhere in the EMU. 
 
Therefore, in this scenario of increased cross-border financial activity in the euro area, Gray et al. 
(2008) point out the importance of identifying the channels that connect the banking and the 
sovereign sectors, not only within a country but across countries as well. On the one hand, a 
                                                          
3 This author points out that the importance of external debt is due to the fact that euro area governments retain full sovereignty over 
the taxation of their citizens, but they are bound by existing treaties and international norms and do not have a free hand in taxing non-
citizens. Therefore, euro countries can always service their domestic debt, even without access to the printing press, but not their external 
debt.    
4 The introduction of the Single Banking License in 1989 through the Second Banking Directive was a decisive step towards a unified 
European financial market, which subsequently led to a convergence in financial legislation and regulation across member countries. 
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systemic banking crisis can induce a contraction of the entire economy, weakening public finances 
and thus transferring the distress to the government. This effect is amplified when the financial 
sector has state guarantees. As a feedback effect, risk is further transmitted to holders of sovereign 
debt. On the other hand, macroeconomic imbalances in a specific country lead to rising sovereign 
spreads and a devaluation of the government debt that is mirrored in banks’ balance sheets. 
Moreover, as the recent European sovereign debt crisis has stressed, transmission of the crisis in 
one country to others through the banking system can be a major issue. 
 
The recent literature on sovereign debt has not studied these linkages in depth. Only a handful of 
recent papers have addressed the interaction between sovereign default and the stability of the 
domestic financial system. The analyses by Mody (2009), Ejsing and Lemke (2009), Gennaioli, 
Martin and Rossi (2010) and Broner, Martin and Ventura (2010), are among them5. The papers 
most closely related to our analysis are the studies by Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Andenmatten 
and Brill (2011). Bolton and Jeanne’s (2011) central issue is the analysis of the international 
contagion caused by the banks’ exposure to the sovereign risk of foreign countries. To that end, 
they use data from the 2010 European stress test and show that financial integration without fiscal 
integration results in an inefficient equilibrium supply of government debt6. Andenmatten and Brill 
(2011) perform a bivariate test for contagion that is based on an approach proposed by Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) to examine whether the co-movement of sovereign CDS premium increased 
significantly after the beginning of the Greek debt crisis in October 2009. Unlike Forbes and 
Rigobon, they conclude that in European countries “both contagion and interdependence” 
occurred.  
 
However, an important constraint in the above-mentioned empirical evidence is the fact that it 
ignores the dynamic component of the degree of interconnexion of public debt markets. In this 
                                                          
5 Beakert et al. (2011) analyze the transmission of crises to country-industry equity portfolios in 55 countries, using the 2007-2009 
financial crisis as a laboratory. 
6The same conclusion is reached by Gros and Mayer (2011) who say that “The EU resembles a group of highly interdependent 
companies with large cross-holdings of equity stakes. However, the formal structure of the group is very light. There is no central 
authority that can give orders to individual members of the group”. They conclude that the euro area can no longer avoid a stark choice: 
“either it sticks to the limited liability character of EMU (but in this case sovereign default becomes likely), or it moves towards a fiscal 
union with a mutual guarantee for the public debt of all member countries”.   
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regard, Abad, Chuliá and Gómez-Puig (2010 and 2012) examine the European government bond 
market integration from a dynamic perspective, applying an asset pricing model to a dataset 
spanning the years 2004 to 20097. Nonetheless, the evolution of the time-varying degree of causality 
of EMU sovereign debt yields behavior (and the factors behind it, especially the role played by 
private debt and cross-border banking linkages) has not yet been analyzed in sufficient depth by the 
literature. This paper aims to carry out an analysis of this kind.  
 
Thus, the main objectives of this paper are threefold: (1) to test for the existence of possible 
Granger-causal relationships between the evolution of the yield of bonds issued by peripheral EMU 
countries, (2) to examine the time-varying nature of these Granger-causal relationships and to 
detect episodes of significant increase in causality between them, and (3) to analyze the 
determinants of those events considering not only macroeconomic imbalances, but also the role 
played by private debt, cross-border banking linkages and indicators of investor sentiment. This 
paper also makes three main contributions to the existing literature. First, it presents a dynamic 
approach to the analysis of the evolution of the degree of Granger-causality of EMU sovereign debt 
yields behavior. Second, it makes use of a unique dataset on private debt-to-GDP by sector 
(households, banks and non-financial corporations) in each EMU country and on cross-border 
banking linkages. Private debt dataset has been built up by the authors using the Monetary Financial 
Institutions (MFI) balance sheet statistics provided for each euro country by the European Central 
Bank, whilst cross border banking linkages are measured using the consolidated claims on an 
immediate borrower basis of Bank for International Settlements reporting banks (in the public, the 
banking and the non-financial private sectors). Third, it focuses the analysis on peripheral EMU 
countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), since these are the countries which have 
come under market pressure since 2009, reflecting investors’ perceptions of risks, and which to a 
large extent have been the origin of the current sovereign debt crisis in the whole eurozone.  
 
                                                          
7 Their results suggest that, from the beginning of the financial market tensions in August 2007, markets moved towards higher 
segmentation, and the differentiation of country risk factors increased substantially across countries. Although the levels were very low, 
the persistence of positive yield spreads against Germany detected before the beginning of the crisis (see Gómez-Puig, 2009a and 2009b) 
was still a reflection of incomplete integration in EMU bond markets. 
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The most important results of the analysis can be summarized as follows. Firstly, we provide 
empirical evidence of the existence of sub-periods of Granger-causality in all pair-wise 
relationships. Secondly, we also present empirical evidence which indicates that the Granger-
causality relationships between peripheral EMU yields have significantly increased during the recent 
crises in sovereign debt markets from 2009. Thirdly, the results of the Probit models estimated to 
analyze the determinants of the episodes of Granger-causality intensification show that in all cases 
the variable that captures cross-border banking linkages is statistically significant. This finding 
might suggest that, not only macroeconomic imbalances may be key determinants of the probability 
of occurrence of those episodes, but in a scenario of increased international financial activity in the 
euro area, transmission of the crisis in one country to other countries through the banking system 
can be a major issue. Lastly, the results support the important role played by private debt, especially 
in the cases of Spain and Italy. 
  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Granger-causality analysis and 
our approach for the detection of episodes of increase in Granger-causality. In Section 3 we carry 
out the exploration of the determinants of these episodes. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the 
findings and offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Granger-causality analysis 
2. 1. Econometric methodology  
 
The concept of Granger-causality was introduced by Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) and is widely 
used to ascertain the importance of the interaction between two series. The central notion is one of 
predictability (Hoover, 2001): one variable Granger-causes some other variable, given an 
information set, if past information about the former can improve the forecast of the latter based 
only in its own past information. Therefore, the knowledge of one series evolution reduces the 
forecast errors of the other, suggesting that the latter does not evolve independently of the former.  
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Testing Granger causality typically employs the same lags for all variables. This poses a potential 
problem, since Granger-causality tests are sensitive to lag length. Therefore, it is important that the 
lengths selected should be the right ones to avoid inconsistently estimating the model and drawing 
misleading inferences (see, Thornton and Batten, 1985). In determining the optimal lag structure 
for each variable, we follow Hsiao’s (1981) sequential method to test for causality, which combines 
Akaike’s final predictive error (FPE, from now on) and the definition of Granger-causality8. 
Essentially, the FPE criterion trades off bias that arises from under-parameterization of a model 
against a loss in efficiency resulting from over-parameterization of the model, removing us from the 
ambiguities of the conventional procedure.  
 
Consider the following models,  
 t 0
1
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i t i t
i
X X  

                     (1) 
0
1 1
m n
t i t i j t j t
i j
X X Y    
 
                                      (2)       
where Xt and Yt  are stationary variables [i.e., they are I(0) variables]. The following steps are used 
to apply Hsiao’s procedure for testing Granger-causality: 
i) Treat Xt as a one-dimensional autoregressive process (1), and compute its FPE with the 
order of lags m varying from 1 to m9. Choose the order which yields the smallest FPE, say 
m, and denote the corresponding FPE as FPEX (m, 0). 
ii) Treat Xt as a controlled variable with m number of lags, and treat Yt as a manipulated 
variable as in (2). Compute again the FPE of (2) by varying the order of lags of Yt from 1 
to n, and determine the order which gives the smallest FPE, say n, and denote the 
corresponding FPE as FPEX (m,n)10. 
                                                          
8 Thornton and Batten (1985) show that the Akaike’s FPE criterion performs well relative to other statistical techniques. 
9 FPEX(m,0)  is computed using the formula: 
1
( ,0) · ,
1
X
T m SSR
FPE m
T m T
 

 
where T is the total number of observations and 
SSR is the sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (1) 
10 FPEX(m,n)  is computed using the formula: 
1
( , ) · ,
1
X
T m n SSR
FPE m n
T m n T
  

  
where T is the total number of observations 
and SSR is the sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (2) 
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iii) Compare FPEX (m, 0) with FPEX (m,n) [i.e., compare the smallest FPE in step (i) with the 
smallest FPE in step (ii)]. If FPEX (m,0) > FPEX (m,n), then Yt is said to cause Xt. If FPEX 
(m,0) < FPEX (m,n), then Xt is an independent process. 
iv) Repeat steps i) to iii) for the Yt variable, treating Xt as the manipulated variable. 
 
When Xt and Yt are not stationary variables, but are first-difference stationary [i.e., they are I(1) 
variables] and cointegrated (see Dolado et al., 1990), it is possible to investigate the existence of a 
Granger-causal relationships from ∆Xt to ∆Yt and from ∆Yt to ∆Xt, using the following error 
correction models: 
 
0
1
m
t i t i t
i
X X  

                                      (3) 
        0 1
1 1
m n
t t i t i j t j t
i j
X Z X Y      
 
                  (4) 
where Zt is the OLS residual of the cointegrating regression ( t tX Y   ), known as the error-
correction term. Note that, if Xt and Yt are I (1) variables, but they are not cointegrated, then β in 
(4) is assumed to be equal to zero. 
 
In both cases [i.e., Xt  and Yt  are I(1) variables, and they are or are not cointegrated], we can use 
Hsiao’s sequential procedure substituting Xt with ∆Xt and Yt with ∆Yt in steps i) to iv), as well as 
substituting expressions (1) and (2) with equations (3) and (4). Proceeding in this way, we ensure 
efficiency since the system is congruent and encompassing (Hendry and Mizon, 1999). 
 
2. 2. Data  
 
We use daily data of 10-year bond yields from 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2010 collected from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream for EMU peripheral countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. Figures 1a and 1b plot the evolution of daily 10-year sovereign bond yields and their spread 
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against the bund for each country in our sample. A simple look at these figures indicates the 
differences in the yields behavior before and after the financial crisis of 2008.  
[Insert Figures 1a and 1b here] 
 
Specifically, it is remarkable that after the introduction of the euro in January 1999 and until the 
subprime crisis in global financial markets in August 2007, spreads on bonds of EMU peripheral 
countries moved in a narrow range with only slight differentiation across countries. In fact, the 
stability and convergence of spreads was considered a hallmark of successful financial integration 
inside the euro area. Nevertheless, after the subprime crisis in 2007, severe tensions emerged in 
financial markets worldwide, including the EMU bond market. Moreover, following the collapse of 
the US financial institution Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, the financial turmoil turned 
into a global financial crisis which began to spread to the real sector.  
 
Therefore, the financial crisis highlighted the imbalances within the euro area and yield spreads 
between government bond issues of participating countries, which had reached levels close to zero 
between 2003 and 2007 (the average value of the 10-year yield spread against the German bund 
moved between -4 and 20 basis points, in the case of Ireland and Greece, respectively), reemerged. 
Indeed, the risk premium on EMU government bonds increased strongly in 2008, reflecting 
investor perceptions of upcoming risks. Concretely, figure 1b displays that by the end of December 
2010 it reached levels of 952 basis points in Greece, 580 in Ireland, 380 in Portugal, 255 in Spain 
and 182 in Italy.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the levels and differences of the 10-year government’s 
yield in peripheral EMU countries during the sample period (1999-2010). As can be seen, the mean 
is not significantly different from zero for the first differences. Normality is tested with the Jarque-
Bera test (which is distributed as χ2(2) under the null) and strongly rejected for both the levels and 
first differences. Since rejection could be due to either excess of kurtosis or skewness, we report 
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these statistics separately in Table 1. Given that the kurtosis of the normal distribution is 3, our 
results suggest that the distribution of the yields of Greece and Ireland, as well as all the first 
differences, are peaked relative to the normal, while the distribution of the yields in the cases of 
Italy, Portugal and Spain are flat relative to the normal. Finally, regarding the asymmetry of the 
distribution of the series around their mean, we find positive skewness for all the variables in levels 
and for the first difference in the case of Italy, suggesting that their distributions have long right 
tails, whilst in the cases of the first differences of yields for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
there is evidence of negative skewness and therefore of distributions with long left tails.  
 
2.3. Preliminary results 
 
As a first step, we tested for the order of integration of the 10-year bond yields by means of the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The results, shown in Table 2, decisively reject the null 
hypothesis of non stationarity, suggesting that both variables can be treated as first-difference 
stationary11.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Following Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2001)’s suggestion, we confirm this result using the Kwiatkowski 
et al. (1992) (KPSS) tests, where the null is a stationary process against the alternative of a unit root. 
As can be seen in Table 3, the results fail to reject the null hypothesis of stationarity in first 
differences, but strongly reject it in levels. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
                                                          
11 These results were confirmed using Phillips-Perron (1998) unit root tests controlling for serial correlation and the Elliott, Rothenberg, 
and Stock (1996) Point Optimal and Ng and Perron (2001) unit root tests for testing non-stationarity it against the alternative of high 
persistence. These additional results are not shown here to save space, but they are available from the authors upon request.  
  
11 
As a second step, we tested for cointegration between each of the 10 pair combinations12 of 
peripheral EMU yields using Johansen (1991, 1995)’s approach. An important decision in this 
approach is whether to include deterministic terms in the cointegrating Vector Autoregressive  
(VAR) model. Deterministic terms, such as the intercept, linear trend, and indicator variables, play a 
crucial role in both data behavior and limiting distributions of estimators and tests in integrated 
processes. Banerjee et al. (1993), Johansen (1994) and Nielsen and Rahbek (2000) show that the 
statistical properties of the commonly used test procedure are affected, indicating that in some 
cases its size cannot be controlled, and that in others there is substantial power loss. Depending on 
their presence or absence, the system may manifest drift, linear trends in cointegration vectors, or 
even quadratic trends. In practical work, there seem to be only two relevant model representations 
for the analysis of cointegration amongst most economic time series variables:   
i. the level data have no deterministic trend and the cointegrating equations have 
intercepts; and  
ii. the level and the cointegrating equations have linear trends.  
 
Table 1 shows that the hypothesis of the expected values of the first differences of the series is 
equal to zero can not be rejected; hence, there is no evidence of linear deterministic trends in the 
data. The graphs in Figure 1a support this finding. Therefore, we conclude that the cointegrated 
VAR model should be formulated according to i), with the constant term restricted to the 
cointegration space, and no deterministic trend terms. This implies that some equilibrium means are 
different from zero.  
 
As can be seen in Table 4, only for the Greece-Ireland and Greece-Portugal cases do the trace test 
indicate the existence of one cointegrating equation at (at least) the 0.05 level. Therefore, for these 
two pairs we test for Granger-causality in first differences of the variables, with an error-correction 
term added [i. e., equations (3) and (4)], whereas for the remaining cases, we test for Granger-
                                                          
12 Recall that the number of possible pairs between our sample of five peripheral EMU yields is given by the following formula 
! 5!
10.
!( )! 2!(5 2)!
n
r n r
 
 
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causality in first differences of the variables, with no error-correction term added [i. e., equations (3) 
and (4) with β=0] 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
 
 
2.4. Empirical results 
The resulting FPE statistics for the whole sample are reported in Table 5.13 
 [Insert Table 5 here] 
As can be seen, in most of the cases our results suggest bidirectional Granger-causality. We do not 
find unidirectional Granger-causality relationships running from Greece to Spain or from Portugal 
to Ireland.  
 
Note that, even though the results of the cointegration tests reject (with only two exceptions) a 
long-run relationship between them, we find evidence of strong Granger-causal linkages between 
peripheral EMU yields. Therefore, each yield series contains useful information that is not present 
in the others which can help to explain the others’ short-run evolution. This finding may indicate 
that peripheral EMU countries are considered by market participants as a group, confirming earlier 
evidence of market segmentation between core and peripheral EMU countries (see, e.g., Sosvilla-
Rivero and Morales-Zumaquero, 2012). 
 
 
In order to gain further insights into the dynamic Granger-causality between the 10 possible 
relationships in peripheral EMU yields, we carry out 33,486 rolling regressions using a window of 
                                                          
13 These results were confirmed using both Wald statistics to test the joint hypothesis 
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ... 0n       in equation (4) and 
Williams-Kloot test for forecasting accuracy (Williams, 1959). These additional results are not shown here to save space, but they are 
available from the authors upon request.  
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200 observations14. In each estimation, we apply Hsiao (1981)’s sequential procedure outlined 
above to determine the optimum FPE (m, 0) and FPE (m, n) statistics in each case. 
  
A graphic presentation of the evolution of the difference between FPE (m, 0) and FPE (m, n) 
statistics in each case is shown in Figure 2. These graphs provide us with a view of the dynamic 
influence of each EMU peripheral yield over the other four and constitute our indicator of time-
varying Granger-causality. Adopting a forward-looking framework, we assign the computed 
indicator to the first date used in the rolling regressions. Therefore, the sample covers the period 1 
January 1999 to 26 March 2010 in all cases, except in those pairs where Greece is present, in which 
case the sample runs from 1 January 2001 to 26 March 2010. Note that if the difference is positive 
in the case XX → YY, this indicates the existence of a statistically significant Granger-causality 
relationship running from country XX towards country YY.  
 
As can be seen, we find sub-periods of Granger-causality in all pair-wise relationships, including 
those running from Greece to Spain and from Portugal to Ireland, even though these relationships 
were rejected in the whole sample tests. In other words, we detect, in all cases, sub-periods where 
the yields on bonds issued by one peripheral EMU country carries relevant and useful information 
about the future behaviour of the yields on bonds issued by other peripheral EMU country.   
 
We proceed further by identifying sub-periods of significant increase in Granger-causality in order 
to be able to analyze which factors may have been behind them. To that aim, we identify episodes 
of Granger-causality intensification as those in which the time-varying Granger-causality indicator is 
greater than its average plus two standard errors15. Therefore, we look for episodes where there is 
                                                          
14 To the best of our knowledge, there is no statistical method to set the optimal window size. The chosen value of 200 observations is 
representative of the one used in practice and seems appropriate for our empirical application since it represents 6.36% of the sample. 
We have also used a value of 100 observations. The results (not shown here to save space, but they are available from the authors upon 
request.) render the same qualitative conclusions than in the case of using 200 observations. 
 
15 We perform formal tests to evaluate whether the series have the same mean during the detected episodes and the rest of the 
observations. The results of these tests (not shown here, but available from the authors upon request) strongly reject the null hypothesis 
of equal mean across sub-samples, and provide additional support for the presence of increased Granger-causality. 
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evidence of an enlargement in the information content of the yield series to significantly improve 
the explanatory power of future evolution of the other yield series, suggesting a strengthening of 
their interdependence. 
 
The graphs in Figure 2 suggest that these episodes are concentrated around the first year of the 
existence of the EMU in 1999, the introduction of euro coins and banknotes in 2002, and the 
global financial crisis of the late-2000s. As can be seen, the graphs also indicate that the Granger-
causality relationships between peripheral EMU yields increased significantly during the recent 
crises in sovereign debt markets since 2009, providing evidence of a reinforcement of the 
interconnexion between them. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
 
3. Determinants of episodes of Granger-causality intensification  
 
3.1. Econometric methodology  
Once the episodes of Granger-causality intensification have been detected, we use Probit models to 
analyze their determinants. In our case, we define a new dependent variable (y) that takes the value 
one if we have detected such episode and zero otherwise. The goal is to quantify the relationship 
between a set of instruments (X) characterizing the country issuing a given bond and the 
probability of an episode of increased causality (y).  
 
To this end, we adopt a specification designed to handle the particular requirements of binary 
dependent variables. Suppose that we model the probability of observing a value of one as: 
                  Pr (y = 1| X, β) = 1 –  (–X’ β) =  (X’ β)                      (5) 
 
where  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. As can be 
seen, we adopt the standard simplifying convention of assuming that the index specification is 
linear in the parameters so that it takes the form X’β. 
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3.2. Instruments to model the Granger-causality intensification 
According to Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens (2000), reasons that may explain the evolution of 
yield’s Granger-causality between countries can be divided into two groups: fundamental-based 
reasons on the one hand, and investor behavior-based reasons on the other. While fundamental-
based transmission works through real and financial linkages across countries, behavior-based is 
more sentiment-driven. Therefore, in our analysis we will use instruments that capture both of 
them. Following the literature, in order to measure fundamental reasons we not only use 
instruments that gauge the country’s fiscal position but also instruments that assess the foreign 
debt, the country’s potential rate of growth, the loss of competitiveness, the private sector 
indebtedness and, specially the cross-border banking system linkages.  
 
Concretely, the variables used to measure the country’s fiscal position are the government debt-to-
GDP (GOVDEB) and the government deficit-to-GDP (DEF). These two variables have been 
widely used in the literature by other authors (see, e.g., Bayoumi et al., 1995) and present the 
advantage over the credit rating that they cannot be considered ex post measures of fiscal 
sustainability. They are compiled from Eurostat, and monthly data are linearly interpolated from 
quarterly observations. Besides, the current-account-balance-to-GDP ratio (CAC) is the instrument 
used as a proxy of the foreign debt and the net position of the country towards the rest of the 
world. The importance of this variable has been underlined by the IMF (2010) and Barrios et al. 
(2009). This variable is drawn from the OECD and monthly data are linearly interpolated from 
quarterly observations. In view of Mody (2009)’s argument that countries’ sensitivity to the financial 
crisis is more pronounced the greater the loss of growth potential and competitiveness, we include 
instruments that measure these features. The unemployment rate (U), which has been collected 
from Eurostat, is the variable used to capture the country’s growth potential, whilst the 
Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices monthly interannual rate of growth (which has also been 
drawn from Eurostat) is the inflation rate measure (INF) we use as a proxy of the appreciation of 
the real exchange rate and, thus, the country’s loss of competitiveness.   
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To assess the interconnection between the public and private debt and the role of the latter in the 
euro area sovereign debt crisis, we also incorporate instruments that capture the level of 
indebtedness of each country’s private sector in the analysis. To that end, we make use of a unique 
dataset on private debt-to-GDP by sector (households, banks and non-financial corporations) in 
each EMU country. In particular, we use three variables: Banks’ debt-to-GDP (BANDEB), non-
financial corporations’ debt-to-GDP (NFIDEB), and households’ debt-to-GDP (HOUDEB), 
which have been constructed from data obtained from the European Central Bank Statistics. A 
summary of their evolution is presented in Table 6. Concretely, we have used the statistics 
corresponding to the Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI) balance sheets in each euro country. 
Thus, household debt corresponds to the total loans to households from MFIs. To isolate it from 
the intermediation effect that would inflate debt ratios, banks’ debt is constructed by subtracting 
M3, banks’ remaining liabilities and banks’ capital and reserves from total MFI liabilities16. And 
non-financial corporation debt is built up by adding non-financial corporation securities to total 
loans to non-financial corporations from MFIs17. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Table 6 clearly shows the importance of private debt in the ongoing crisis. Concretely, after the 
subprime crisis in August 2007, not only does the government level of indebtedness increase in the 
euro area (the ratio over the GDP achieves levels of 143%, 119%, 96%, 93% and 60% at the end of 
December 2010 in Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, respectively) but private borrowing 
also registers a sizeable increase. In particular, as can be observed, at the end of 2010, banks’ debt-
to-GDP is huge in Ireland (729%), but is also high in Portugal, Spain and Greece (182%, 159% and 
98%). On the other hand, households’ debt-to-GDP surpasses the 80% threshold in Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain, whilst non-financial corporations’ debt-to-GDP is close to 90% in Portugal and 
Spain and around 70% in Ireland. Thus, during the period 2007-2010, whereas the government 
                                                          
16 The banks’ debt variable we have constructed avoids the effects of intermediation, even though it can only be considered as an 
approximation of its real value, and some caveats are in order: specifically, some deposits will appear as debt (those not included in M3) 
and some debt securities will not be considered debt (those included in M3). 
17 Non-financial corporations’ (NFCs) debt should also include “net equity of households” (liabilities of NFCs from direct pension 
commitments to their employees). Nevertheless, we have ignored this variable since it was not available for all the countries in the 
sample. 
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debt-to-GDP ratio registers the highest increases compared to the period 2002-2006 in Ireland, 
Portugal and Greece (39%, 15% and 9%), there is a much steeper rise in the banks’ debt-to-GDP 
ratio which is higher than 150% in Greece, close to 70% in Ireland, around 64% in Spain and close 
to 40% in Portugal. Besides, households’ debt-to-GDP ratio registers an increase close to 30% in 
Greece, close to 20% in Ireland and Spain and around 15% in Italy, whilst non-financial 
corporations’ debt-to-GDP ratio rises close to 30%, 25% and 20% in Ireland, Spain and Greece 
respectively. 
 
As it has already been mentioned, some authors (Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Allen et al. (2011) 
among them) outline that, in an scenario of increased international financial activity in the euro 
area, not only public finances imbalances are key determinants of the probability that the sovereign 
debt crisis could spill over from one country to another, but that transmission of the crisis through 
the banking system can also be a major issue. Therefore, in our analysis we also include variables 
that capture the important cross-border banking system linkages in euro area countries. These 
linkages are measured using the consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis of Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) reporting banks in the public, banking and non-financial private 
sectors as a proportion of GDP (monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations). In particular, we include foreign bank claims on government debt-to-GDP (PUB), 
on bank debt-to-GDP (BAN) and on non-financial private sector debt-to-GDP (PRI). The 
evolution of these variables is summarized in Table 7. 
 
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
 
The figures in Table 7 underline the fact that, as it was mentioned in the Introduction, the causes of 
the debt crises that led to subsequent rescues in Europe varied substantially according to country. 
Greek fiscal deficit and public debt to GDP were close to 15% and 130% at the end of 2009 as a 
result of chronic macroeconomic imbalances. Besides, on average, foreign banks’ claims on its 
public sector debt represented around 30% of its GDP during the period 2005-2010. Conversely, in 
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Ireland, the crisis was mainly due to the private sector, particularly the domestic housing boom 
which was financed by foreign borrowing. In particular, the amount of bank and non-financial 
enterprise debt claimed by foreign banks is huge during the period 2005-2010 (102% and 216% of 
its GDP, on average). Finally, in Portugal, markets were mostly worried about the country’s high 
external debt, specifically, that of its non-financial corporations. During the 2005-2010 period, 
foreign banks’ claims on Portuguese enterprises surpassed 40% of the country’s GDP.   
 
Moreover, we also explore the role of consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis 
provided by BIS by nationality of reporting banks as a proportion of total foreign claims on each 
country. This variable is denoted as XXYYBAN, meaning the percentage of country XX’s foreign 
claims held by country YY’s banks (again, monthly data have been linearly interpolated from 
quarterly observations).  
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
This information is displayed in Table 8 and is very useful for understanding the channels of 
transmission of debt crises through the banking system. It can be observed that at the end of 2010 
French and German banks were the most exposed to foreign Greek debt, holding 39.6% and 
23.7% of total foreign Greek claims respectively. In the case of Ireland, the maximum risk was 
borne by British banks (29.9%) followed by the Germans (26.13%). A Portuguese default would be 
especially harmful for Spanish banks which hold 41.9% of Portuguese banks’ total claims. Finally, 
around 45% and close to 65% of Spanish and Italian foreign claims, respectively, are held by 
French and German banks.      
 
Finally, as mentioned, we also introduce an instrument that might capture investor behavior-based 
reasons of crisis’s transmission. We use the credit rating as a proxy of the default risk (RAT). 
Standard &Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch ratings for each government’s debt are compiled from 
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Bloomberg. Following Blanco (2001), we build up a scale to gauge the effect of investor sentiment 
based on the rating offered by the three agencies18.  
 
                                                          
18 By construction, the higher the scale, the worse the rating categories. 
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3.3. Empirical results 
Given that the instruments used as independent variables have been constructed on a monthly 
frequency, we need also to compute the dependent variable in the Probit models on a monthly 
basis. To do so, we first assign a value of 1 to the daily observation if the time-varying Granger-
causality indicator is greater than its average plus two standard errors. In the second step, we 
compute the monthly data by averaging the daily observation and assigning a value of 1 if the 
resulting monthly average is greater than 0.5 (i. e., if at least for half of the month there is evidence 
of Granger-causality intensification).  
 
Appendix 1 offers a summary of the explanatory variable used in the empirical analysis as well as 
the data sources.  
 
We follow the general to specific approach characteristic of the London School of Economics 
based on the theory of reduction (Hendry, 1995, ch. 9). Therefore, our empirical analysis starts with 
a general statistical model that captures the essential characteristics of the underlying dataset, 
reducing the complexity of this general model by eliminating statistically insignificant variables, 
checking the validity of the reductions at every stage to ensure congruence of the finally selected 
model. In Table 9 we report the final results of the Probit models estimated by maximum 
likelihood for the sample period March 2005 to March 201019,20. The z-statistics in that table are 
based on robust standard errors computed using the Huber-White quasi-maximum likelihood 
method. 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
                                                          
19 Note that even though we could be dealing with a binary choice model with I(1) regressors, Park and Phillips (2000) have proved that 
the coefficient estimated by maximum likelihood are still consistent, converging at a rate T3/4 along its principal component, having a 
slower rate of T314 convergence in all other directions. Moreover, this authors showed that the limit distribution of the maximum 
likelihood estimator was mixed normal with mixing variates being dependent upon Brownian local time as well as Brownian motion, so 
the usual inference methods are still valid Grabowski (2007)  have added that when among the regressors include variables with different 
orders of  integration, the rate of convergence of the estimate of the coefficients depend of such order: T314 for stationary regressors and 
T314 for I(1) or I(2) regressors. 
20 The reduction in the sample period is imposed by the availability of data regarding the consolidated claims of Bank for International 
Settlements’ reporting banks on each sector. 
  
21 
 
The analysis of the coefficient values is complicated by the fact that coefficients estimated from a 
binary model cannot be interpreted as the marginal effect on the dependent variable. Nevertheless, 
the direction of the effect of a change in any instrument depends only on the sign of the coefficient 
estimated: positive values imply that an increase in a given instrument will raise the probability of 
contagion, while negative values indicate the opposite. 
 
As expected, our results indicate that the variables used to measure the country’s fiscal position 
(GOVDEB and DEF) are important determinants of the probability of an episode of Granger-
causality’s increase. However, our results also indicate that other factors beyond the fiscal position 
explain those episodes, too. Interestingly, the variable XXYYBAN is statistically significant in all 
cases; suggesting that, in a scenario of increased cross-border financial activity in the euro area, 
transmission of the crisis in one country to other countries through the banking system can really 
be a major issue.  
 
Moreover, the instruments used to gauge both the level of competitiveness (INF) and the net 
position towards the rest of the world (CAC) are statistically significant with the expected sign. In 
particular, they are extremely useful when explaining the Granger-causality from Greece, Spain and 
Portugal. In relation to the variables used to capture the country’s growth potential, we find a 
positive influence for the unemployment rate, which suggests that the weaker the economy, the 
higher the probability of sovereign debt crisis transmission. This conclusion is particularly relevant 
in the case of Greece, Italy and Portugal. 
 
With regard to the role of private debt, we find empirical evidence supporting its importance in the 
cases of Spain and Italy. Interestingly, this variable is not significant in the case of Ireland, even 
though some authors have claimed that it was the main cause of the debt crisis in this country. 
Nevertheless, we detect a major effect of foreign bank claims on banking and non-financial private 
sector debt-to-GDP on the probability of an episode of Granger-causality’s increase from Ireland. 
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This finding seems to underline the dependence of Ireland’s domestic expansion on foreign 
borrowing. 
 
Finally, as regards the impact of investor sentiment, the credit rating scale seems to be an important 
determinant in six out of the 20 cases considered.  
 
In Table 9 we report the McFadden R-squared as a measure of goodness of the fit. As can be seen, 
it ranges from 0.5595 to 0.8474, suggesting the relative success of the Probit regression models in 
predicting the values of the dependent variable within the sample21. As a further test to evaluate 
how well our estimated Probit models fit the observations, we compute the fitted probability both 
within-sample and out-of-sample. Recall that when generating our indicator, we left out nine 
observations (April to December 2010) that were not used in the estimation. This allows us to 
evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the estimated Probit models based on the actual 
evolution of the instrumental variables.  Figure 3 reports the results. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
As can be seen, the fitted probabilities closely track the evolution of the observed within-sample 
probabilities. Regarding the out-of-sample probabilities, our results suggest the occurrence of an 
additional episode of significant increase of Granger-causality in the last months of 2010 coinciding 
with a period of renewed turbulence in European debt markets. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
In the current context of uncertainty in European sovereign debt markets, the analysis presented in 
this paper deals with a subject that has not been addressed in sufficient depth by the literature and 
is of particular relevance both to academics and to policy-makers. 
                                                          
21The same conclusion is reached when performing the Pearson-type test of goodness-of-fit proposed by Hosmer and Lemeshow 
(2000.)  
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Concretely, this paper presents a dynamic approach to the analysis of the evolution of the degree of 
Granger-causality between peripheral EMU sovereign yields behavior (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain). To this end, we have (1) tested for the existence of possible Granger-causal 
relationships between the evolution of these countries’ 10-year yields, (2) examined the time-varying 
nature of these Granger-causal relationships to detect episodes of significant increase of causality 
between them, and (3) analyzed the determinants of these episodes. 
 
Since it seems increasingly clear that the origin of sovereign debt crisis in Europe has gone beyond 
the imbalances in public finances and that there is an obvious interconnection between public and 
private debt, we have analyzed the role of the latter in the episodes of Granger-causality 
intensification by using a unique dataset on private debt-to-GDP by sector (households, banks and 
non-financial corporations) in each peripheral EMU country. Besides, since the reasons that may 
explain transmission of sovereign debt crisis from one country to another can be fundamental-
based or investor behavior-based, we have included instruments that capture both types. In 
addition, we have borne in mind that fundamental-based interconnection works not only through 
real linkages, but also through financial linkages across countries. Specifically, in the current 
scenario of increased cross-border financial activity in the euro area, special attention has been paid 
to the impact of the degree of integration of the banking system on the speed at which a sovereign 
crisis in a country can spill over to others. This channel of transmission has generally been ignored 
by the recent literature, but its relevance is crucial.  
 
The main results of our analysis can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the results of the rolling 
analysis we apply in order to explore the dynamic causality between peripheral EMU yields suggest 
that there exist sub-periods of Granger-causality in all pair-wise relationships. Secondly, our 
empirical evidence suggests that the episodes with significant Granger-causality increase are 
concentrated around the first year of the launch of the EMU in 1999, the introduction of euro 
coins and banknotes in 2002 and, specially, the global financial crisis in the late-2000s. Therefore, 
our results indicate that the Granger-causality relationships between peripheral EMU yields have 
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been significantly reinforced during the recent crises in sovereign debt markets since 2009. Thirdly, 
the results of the Probit models estimated to analyze the determinants of the previously detected 
episodes indicate that in all cases the variable that captures cross-border banking linkages is 
statistically significant. This finding suggests that, in a scenario of increased international financial 
activity in the euro area, transmission of the crisis in one country to other countries through the 
banking system may be an important issue (this is explained by the “financial trilemma” laid out by 
Schoenmaker, 2011). It is important to recall that macroeconomic imbalances in a specific country 
(the instruments we have used to capture them also indicate that they are key determinants of the 
probability of occurrence of an episode of Granger-causality’s increase) lead to rising sovereign 
spreads and a devaluation of the government debt that is mirrored in banks’ balance sheets. Lastly, 
regarding the role of private debt, we find evidence of its importance in the cases of Spain and Italy. 
However, we detect a major effect of foreign bank claims on private sector debt in the case of 
Ireland, which seems to underline the dependence of Ireland’s domestic boom on foreign 
borrowing.  
 
Therefore, our results suggest that euro area crisis faces multiple overlapping and mutually 
reinforcing elements of fiscal (Greece/Portugal), banking (Ireland/Spain), and competitiveness 
(Southern periphery) crises. This situation has lead many authors (see, for example, Bergsten and 
Kirkegaard, 2012) to state that the euro area is foremost facing a crisis of “institutional design”. 
Indeed, the euro crisis is now in its third year and there is still no end in sight. The main reason for 
this situation is that some of its root causes have been left largely unattended. In particular, no 
mechanism has been put in place to address the feedback loop between sovereigns and banks that 
our results have shown. In this context, Pisani-Ferry (2011) lays out that the euro was imagined in 
the late 1980s in response to what was known as Mundell’s trilemma, according to which no 
country can enjoy at the same time free capital flows, stable exchange rates and independent 
monetary policies. Twenty years later, the euro area faces another trilemma that stems from three of 
the basic principles upon which the European currency is based: the absence of co-responsibility 
over public debt, the strict no-monetary financing rule and the combination of free capital 
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movements and national responsibility for supervising and, if needed, rescuing banking systems. 
The coexistence of these three principles makes the euro area fragile, for two reasons. First, adverse 
shocks to sovereign solvency tend to interact perversely with adverse shocks to bank solvency. 
Second, the central bank is constrained in its ability to stem self-fulfilling debt crises. Therefore, 
now as twenty years ago, the question is which of the constraints the euro area should give in. The 
problem is that putting in place the necessary mechanism to solve the trilemma would involve 
transforming the euro area into a full-fledged monetary union with a fiscal and banking union. In 
turn, this would require agreement on sharing sovereignty, mutualising risk and creating European-
level accountability channels that would amount to creating a political union. Although nothing 
short of such political union might ultimately be sufficient to ensure the long term viability of the 
monetary union, it is equally clear that it will take significant time to achieve even under the most 
optimistic assumptions. 
 
At this juncture, however, what appears more feasible and some of the short run policy 
implications that we suggest in this paper to fight this crisis are the following. The euro area would 
need  (a) to take a decisive step forward by creating a banking union (see, for example, Pisani-Ferry 
et al., 2012, or Schoenmaker and Gros, 2012) and/or (b) to issue jointly guaranteed Eurobonds (see 
Favero and Missale, 2011, Delpla and von Weizsacker, 2010, 2011, or Claessens et al., 2012, among 
others). 
 
Schoenmaker and Gros (2012) claim that the European Commission and the EU Council are still 
seeking solutions at the national level, whilst the financial trilemma (Schoenmaker, 2011) shows that 
policymakers have to choose 2 out of 3 objectives: 1) financial stability, 2) cross-border banking or 
3) national policies. In the context of this trilemma, these authors assert that the best policy option 
would be to take the financial trilemma to its logical conclusion and move powers for financial 
policies (regulation, supervision and stability) further to the European level, since a European 
banking policy is needed to preserve cross-border banking as well as financial stability. Indeed, the 
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ECB  is supporting this call for a European banking policy in its latest Financial Integration Report 
(see, European Central Bank, 2012).  
 
On the other hand, the idea that Eurobonds could offer relief to Member States with weak fiscal 
fundamentals, like Italy and Spain, and help solve the euro-area debt crisis has also emerged in both 
the policy and academic debate. The most forceful argument against a jointly guaranteed Eurobond 
(see, for example, Issing, 2009) is that it would undermine fiscal discipline by removing incentives 
for sound budgetary policies and that the cross-default nature of the joint guarantees would 
undermine the no bailout clause of the EU Treaty (heightening the risk of moral hazard). However, 
advocates of Eurobonds as Delpla and von Weizsacker (2010, 2011) and Claessens et al. (2012) 
contend that the use of Eurobonds should not only be limited but also conditional on the 
implementation of fiscal adjustment and reforms. Moreover, some authors (Favero and Missale, 
2011, among them) have argued that to the extent that market irrationality and contagion play a 
greater role than fiscal fundamentals in the pricing of risk, a common Eurobond could be a useful 
instrument to halt the crisis transmission.  
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Appendix 1: Definition of the Explanatory Variables in the Probit models and Data 
Sources 
 
NAME VARIABLE SOURCE 
CACXX  Current-account-balance-to-GDP of country XX 
 
OECD (monthly data are linearly interpolated from 
quarterly observations) 
UXX  
 
Unemployment rate of country XX Eurostat (monthly data) 
INFXX  Inflation rate of country XX 
 
Eurostat (HICP monthly interannual rate of 
growth) 
RATXX  
 
Credit rating scale of country XX. Bloomberg: Standard &Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch 
ratings for each government’s debt. 
DEFXX  Government deficit-to-GDP of country XX. 
 
Eurostat (monthly data are linearly interpolated 
from quarterly observations) 
XXGOVDEB  
 
Government debt-to-GDP of country XX. Eurostat (monthly data are linearly interpolated 
from quarterly observations) 
XXBANDEB  
 
 
 
Banks’ debt-to-GDP of country XX 
ECB’s Monetary Financial Institutions balance 
sheets and own estimates (monthly data). GDP has 
been obtained from Eurostat (monthly data are 
linearly interpolated from quarterly observations) 
XXNFIDEB   
Non-financial corporations’ debt-to-GDP of 
country XX 
 
ECB’s Monetary Financial Institutions balance 
sheets and own estimates (monthly data). GDP has 
been obtained from Eurostat (monthly data are 
linearly interpolated from quarterly observations) 
XXHOUDEB  
 
 
 
Households’ debt-to-GDP of country XX 
ECB’s Monetary Financial Institutions balance 
sheets and own estimates (monthly data). GDP has 
been obtained from Eurostat (monthly data are 
linearly interpolated from quarterly observations) 
XXBAN   
Foreign bank claims on banks debt-to-GDP of 
country XX 
 
BIS Quarterly Review: June 2011, Table 7C. GDP 
has been obtained from the OECD (monthly data 
are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations) 
XXPUB   
Foreign bank claims on government debt-to-
GDP of country XX 
 
BIS Quarterly Review: June 2011, Table 7C. GDP 
has been obtained from the OECD (monthly data 
are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations) 
XXPRI   
Foreign bank claims on non-financial private 
debt-to-GDP of country XX 
 
BIS Quarterly Review: June 2011, Table 7C. GDP 
has been obtained from the OECD (monthly data 
are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations) 
XXYYBAN  Percentage of country XX’s foreign claims held 
by country YY’s banks 
 
BIS Quarterly Review: June 2011, Table 9D and 
own estimates. 
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Figure 1a. Daily 10-year sovereign yields in peripheral EMU countries: 1999-2010 
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Figure 1b. Daily 10-year sovereign yield spreads over Germany: 1999-2010 
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Figure 2: FPE sequence from rolling regressions 
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Figure 3: Probit results 
 
 
 
 
  
38 
 
 
  
  
39 
SP -> PT
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
m
a
r-
0
5
ju
l-
0
5
n
o
v
-0
5
m
a
r-
0
6
ju
l-
0
6
n
o
v
-0
6
m
a
r-
0
7
ju
l-
0
7
n
o
v
-0
7
m
a
r-
0
8
ju
l-
0
8
n
o
v
-0
8
m
a
r-
0
9
ju
l-
0
9
n
o
v
-0
9
m
a
r-
1
0
ju
l-
1
0
n
o
v
-1
0
observed fitted
 
PT -> SP
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
m
a
r-
0
5
ju
l-
0
5
n
o
v
-0
5
m
a
r-
0
6
ju
l-
0
6
n
o
v
-0
6
m
a
r-
0
7
ju
l-
0
7
n
o
v
-0
7
m
a
r-
0
8
ju
l-
0
8
n
o
v
-0
8
m
a
r-
0
9
ju
l-
0
9
n
o
v
-0
9
m
a
r-
1
0
ju
l-
1
0
n
o
v
-1
0
observed fitted
 
  
  
40 
 
  
 
 
  
41 
 
Note: GR, IE, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Levels     
  GR IE IT PT SP 
 Mean 4.995 4.543 4.491 4.541 4.379 
 Median 4.544 4.459 4.374 4.405 4.232 
 Maximum 12.440 9.012 5.879 7.104 5.870 
 Minimum 3.206 3.038 3.215 2.997 3.025 
 Std. Dev. 1.637 0.828 0.615 0.722 0.650 
 Skewness 2.714 1.236 0.343 0.423 0.376 
 Kurtosis 10.589 7.304 2.268 2.793 2.230 
 Jarque-Bera 9468.5 3213.9 131.5 99.0 151.2 
 Observations 2610 3131 3131 3131 3131 
Panel B: First differences       
  DGR DIE DIT DPT DSP 
 Mean 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Maximum 1.304 0.682 0.213 0.546 0.253 
 Minimum -4.323 -1.028 -0.319 -1.470 -0.441 
 Std. Dev. 0.117 0.058 0.041 0.062 0.044 
 Skewness -17.879 -1.162 0.181 -4.230 -0.077 
 Kurtosis 720.496 48.784 5.562 113.490 7.960 
 Jarque-Bera 56102048.0 274076.8 873.0 1601451.0 3211.0 
 Observations 2609 3130 3130 3130 3130 
 
Note: GR, IE, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
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Table 2. Augmented Dickey- Fuller tests for unit roots. 
Panel A: I (2) versus I (1) (Variables in first differences) 
 ττ τµ Τ 
GR -17.8072* -17.6380* -17.5929* 
IE -47.7382* -47.7020* -47.6802* 
IT -52.3394* -52.3468* -52.3535* 
PT -31.6051* -31.5955* -31.5838* 
SP -51.8722* -51.8773* -51.8802* 
Panel B: I (1) versus I (0) (Variables in levels) 
 ττ τµ Τ 
GR 0.2766 1.2043 1.5440 
IE 0.3425 0.3400 1.3145 
IT -2.6923 -2.0867 0.0225 
PT -1.0206 -1.2202 0.6855 
SP -1.8358 -1.7678 0.2859 
Notes:  
The ADF statistic is a test for the null hypothesis of a unit root. 
ττ, τμ and τ denote the ADF statistics with drift and trend, with drift, and without drift, respectively.  
* denotes significance at the 1% level. Critical values based on MacKinnon (1996) 
GR, IE, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 
 
Table 3. KPSS tests for stationarity 
Panel A: I (2) versus I (1) (Variables in first differences) 
  ττ τµ 
GR  0.1052 0.2574 
IE  0.0877 0.3287 
IT  0.1083 0.1072 
PT  0.1103 0.1868 
SP  0.0975 0.1551 
Panel B: I (1) versus I (0) Variables in leves) 
  ττ τµ 
GR  0.9832* 1.8948* 
IE  1.1606* 1.1528* 
IT  0.6825* 2.9237* 
PT  0.9373* 1.6140* 
SP  0.8374* 3.0079* 
Notes:  
The KPSS statistic is a test for the null hypothesis of stationarity. 
ττ and τμ denote the KPSS statistics with drift and trend, and with drift, respectively.  
* denotes significance at the 1% level. Asymptotic critical values based on Kwiatkowski et al. (1992. Table 1) 
GR, IE, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
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Table 4. Cointegration tests 
 Hypothesized numbers of  
cointegrating relations 
Trace statistica 
 
p-valueb 
GR. IE None 
At most one 
 
20.3839** 
1.0135 
0.0481 
0.9498 
GR. IT None 
At most one 
 
16.5832 
3.0084 
0.1488 
0.5791 
GR. PT None 
At most one 
 
21.0916** 
2.8721 
0.0384 
0.6049 
GR. SP None 
At most one 
 
14.7411 
2.6170 
0.2416 
0.6544 
IE. IT None 
At most one 
 
12.6781 
1.2744 
0.3901 
0.9118 
IE. PT None 
At most one 
 
10.2764 
1.7622 
0.6127 
0.8244 
IE. SP None 
At most one 
 
9.67O6 
1.0393 
0.6721 
0.9464 
IT. PT None 
At most one 
 
9.2582 
1.8854 
0.7119 
0.8004 
IT. SP None 
At most one 
 
13.5751 
2.7382 
0.3197 
0.6307 
PT. SP None 
At most one 
 
15.5181 
2.9255 
0.1981 
0.5947 
 
Notes:   
* and ** denote rejection of the hypothesis at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.   
MacKinnon et al. (1999)’s p-values.  
GR, IE, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
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Table 5. FPE statistics for the whole sample 
 FPE(m.0)x10-3 FPE(m.n) x10-3 Causality 
GR →  IE 3.4311 (1.0) 3.3972 (1.1) Yes 
  IE   → GR 13.1864 (4.0) 12.8586 (4.4) Yes 
GR →  IT 1.6707 (1.0) 1.6695 (1.1) Yes 
 IT  →  GR 13.1864 (4.0) 13.0770 (4.1) Yes 
 GR →  PT 3.5423 (4.0) 3.5096 (4.1) Yes 
 PT →  GR 13.1864 (4.0) 12.6075 (4.4) Yes 
GR → SP 1.9055 (4.0) 1.9063 (4.1) No 
 SP  → GR 13.1864 (4.0) 13.1102 (4.4) Yes 
IE  →  IT 1.6910 (1.0) 1.6586 (1.1) Yes 
IT  →  IE 3.2584 (1.0) 3.2596 (1.1) Yes 
IE  →  PT 3.8007 (4.0) 3.6855 (4.1) Yes 
PT →  IE 3.2584 (1.0) 3.2602 (1.1) No 
IE  →  SP 1.9248 (4.0) 1.8941 (4.1) Yes 
SP →  IE 3.2584 (1.0) 1.9248 (1.4) Yes 
IT  → PT 3.8007 (4.0) 3.7989 (4.1) Yes 
PT → IT 1.6910 (1.0) 1.6812 (1.1) Yes 
IT  → SP 1.9248 (4.0) 1.9214 (4.1) Yes 
SP  → IT 1.6910 (1.0) 1.6878 (1.1) Yes 
PT  → SP 1.9248 (4.0) 1.9183 (4.1) Yes 
SP  → PT 3.8007 (4.0) 3.7832 (4.11) Yes 
Notes:  
The figures in brackets are the optimum order of lags in each pair of countries 
GR, IE, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
46 
Table 6. Debt-to-GDP by sector. 
 
Note: Debt-to-GDP at the end of each year.   
Source: Eurostat, Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) balance sheets obtained from the European Central Bank and 
authors’ estimates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GREECE 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2002-06 (I) Average 2007-10 (II) % (II)/(I) 
Banks  24.6 26.0 25.5 28.4 33.7 48.4 63.2 68.5 97.6 27.6 69.4 151% 
Households  19.5 22.6 27.0 32.6 37.0 40.4 40.8 41.5 59.9 35.7 45.6 28% 
Non-financial corporations  32.6 33.2 34.0 37.5 39.0 43.1 50.9 48.0 53.0 41.3 48.8 18% 
General Government  101.7 97.4 98.9 109.0 106.4 105.4 110.7 127.1 142.8 111.0 121.5 9% 
IRELAND 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2002-06 (I) Average 2007-10 (II) % (II)/(I) 
Banks  287.1 329.0 399.3 491.9 579.6 609.7 726.1 753.6 729.1 417.4 704.6 69% 
Households  43.9 48.5 60.9 70.9 77.8 81.2 84.8 92.3 89.5 72.2 86.9 20% 
Non-financial corporations  40.2 44.0 55.4 63.6 79.9 91.3 105.9 107.2 72.0 73.3 94.1 28% 
General Government  30.7 31.0 29.5 27.4 24.8 25.0 44.4 65.6 96.2 41.6 57.8 39% 
ITALY 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2002-06 (I) Average 2007-10 (II) % (II)/(I) 
Banks  65.5 69.4 71.9 77.1 85.6 94.1 104.1 105.9 104.3 73.9 102.1 38% 
Households  21.5 23.0 25.1 27.0 28.5 29.8 30.3 32.7 38.1 28.4 32.7 15% 
Non-financial corporations  44.4 46.4 47.4 48.0 51.7 56.8 60.9 61.7 62.3 53.3 60.4 13% 
General Government  105.7 104.4 103.9 105.9 106.6 103.6 106.3 116.1 119.0 107.9 111.3 3% 
PORTUGAL 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2002-06 (I) Average 2007-10 (II) % (II)/(I) 
Banks  106.3 113.3 101.6 103.8 115.3 126.4 136.6 156.3 182.5 108.1 150.4 39% 
Households  59.3 58.6 60.4 64.5 70.7 74.5 78.3 81.7 82.3 70.0 79.2 13% 
Non-financial corporations  68.2 67.9 67.2 70.8 72.7 78.7 90.8 93.0 90.6 77.8 88.3 14% 
General Government  53.8 55.9 57.6 62.8 69.5 68.3 71.6 83.0 93.0 68.4 79.0 15% 
SPAIN 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2002-06 (I) Average 2007-10 (II) % (II)/(I) 
Banks  72.4 78.5 84.7 107.3 116.9 133.7 150.1 161.4 159.2 92.0 151.1 64% 
Households  47.5 51.1 55.8 66.4 74.2 78.3 81.9 83.5 82.1 69.0 81.4 18% 
Non-financial corporations  47.1 49.6 53.8 63.0 76.3 85.5 91.2 90.4 87.0 71.6 88.5 24% 
General Government  52.5 48.7 46.2 43.0 39.6 36.1 39.8 53.3 60.1 46.6 47.3 2% 
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Table 7. Foreign banks’ claims on individual countries-to-GDP by sector. 
Foreign banks’ claims on public sector debt/GDP         
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
GREECE 30.79 33.64 36.07 30.56 29.93 17.64 29.77 
IRELAND 4.78 6.19 7.56 8.37 15.19 11.69 8.96 
ITALY 20.59 21.55 23.24 21.45 24.05 13.07 20.66 
PORTUGAL 19.47 22.03 20.61 20.60 24.00 12.68 19.90 
SPAIN 8.46 8.86 8.16 7.50 9.21 6.73 8.15 
Foreign banks’ claims on banks debt/GDP         
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
GREECE 6.23 7.02 10.04 12.17 10.33 3.55 8.23 
IRELAND 103.93 120.21 140.62 100.51 92.71 51.09 101.51 
ITALY 10.85 12.87 14.97 11.03 9.46 7.38 11.09 
PORTUGAL 15.77 19.14 23.58 19.71 21.08 15.88 19.19 
SPAIN 16.72 20.78 26.61 23.51 23.03 14.91 20.93 
Foreign banks’ claims on non-financial private sector debt/GDP     
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
GREECE 16.73 27.42 35.73 36.01 26.07 26.22 28.03 
IRELAND 133.91 177.50 251.16 269.12 252.07 213.98 216.29 
ITALY 11.60 20.67 28.28 23.07 24.97 22.83 21.90 
PORTUGAL 32.12 38.35 46.84 46.22 49.83 45.57 43.15 
SPAIN 17.38 25.38 33.61 29.83 30.52 25.09 26.97 
 
Note: Reliance on foreign bank financing is measured by the consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis of 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reporting banks on each sector (public, banks and non-financial corporations as 
a proportion of GDP). Data correspond to the end of each year.  
Source: This table has been constructed from data collected from Table 9C of BIS Quarterly Review: June 2011 and the 
OECD. 
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Table 8.  Claims by nationality of reporting banks as a proportion of total foreign claims. 
GREECE 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Austrian banks 3.3 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.5 
Belgian banks 8.7 5.6 5.7 3.8 2.0 1.3 4.5 
Finnish banks 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
French banks 9.4 19.1 24.4 28.4 36.7 39.6 26.2 
German banks 22.0 18.1 15.9 14.5 20.9 23.7 19.2 
Irish banks 0.0 5.6 3.6 3.2 4.0 0.6 2.8 
Italian banks 2.2 0.0 4.3 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.7 
Dutch banks 11.3 8.8 7.9 4.9 5.7 3.5 7.0 
Portuguese banks 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.4 4.6 7.2 3.5 
Spanish banks 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 
British banks 5.4 4.6 5.5 4.8 7.1 9.8 6.2 
US banks 5.0 4.1 3.4 2.6 7.7 5.1 4.6 
Others 30.3 28.7 24.0 29.3 5.4 3.3 20.2 
IRELAND 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Austrian banks 1.22 1.39 1.16 0.76 1.27 0.64 1.1 
Belgian banks 8.82 10.52 8.42 6.75 5.68 5.62 7.6 
Finnish banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.0 
French banks 7.30 9.06 12.02 10.10 8.47 6.55 8.9 
German banks 25.78 23.95 25.90 29.97 29.88 26.13 26.9 
Greek banks 0.22 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.1 
Italian banks 3.71 2.96 3.43 3.62 2.83 2.99 3.3 
Dutch banks 9.92 7.49 5.69 5.25 4.58 3.70 6.1 
Portuguese banks 0.52 0.75 0.40 0.56 0.76 1.14 0.7 
Spanish banks 3.11 3.81 3.04 2.20 2.38 2.22 2.8 
British banks 26.49 26.91 26.21 28.22 27.12 29.91 27.5 
US banks 3.15 3.97 4.51 4.89 9.28 11.27 6.2 
Others 9.77 9.07 9.15 7.63 7.67 9.57 8.8 
PORTUGAL 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Austrian banks 1.39 1.31 1.09 1.11 1.15 0.81 1.1 
Belgian banks 5.14 6.65 4.77 5.28 2.33 1.75 4.3 
Finnish banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.0 
French banks 10.28 10.55 13.79 13.11 17.83 13.33 13.1 
German banks 20.64 19.27 20.05 19.50 18.79 18.03 19.4 
Greek banks 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.0 
Irish banks 0.00 4.30 3.62 2.78 2.16 1.35 2.4 
Italian banks 3.18 3.83 3.39 2.72 2.66 2.01 3.0 
Dutch banks 7.45 6.66 7.39 6.07 5.61 3.24 6.1 
Spanish banks 35.12 31.99 32.23 33.93 33.71 41.89 34.8 
British banks 11.17 8.68 8.55 9.62 10.20 12.05 10.0 
US banks 1.64 2.26 1.51 0.81 1.85 2.61 1.8 
Others 3.98 4.50 3.60 5.05 3.66 2.70 3.9 
SPAIN 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Austrian banks 0.86 0.87 0.82 0.87 0.96 0.95 0.9 
Belgian banks 4.22 4.52 4.44 4.82 2.46 3.06 3.9 
Finnish banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.0 
French banks 18.25 14.94 18.92 19.35 22.97 20.01 19.1 
German banks 26.51 30.07 29.23 27.83 25.89 25.88 27.6 
Greek banks 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.0 
Irish banks 0.00 3.86 3.84 3.70 3.45 2.13 2.8 
Italian banks 2.49 2.34 2.70 3.12 3.39 4.22 3.0 
Dutch banks 16.87 13.95 13.36 13.69 13.02 10.94 13.6 
Portugal banks 2.61 2.84 2.77 3.14 3.14 3.80 3.0 
British banks 15.23 13.84 12.55 13.66 11.98 15.25 13.8 
US banks 4.55 4.72 4.12 3.67 6.31 6.72 5.0 
Others 8.35 8.02 7.25 6.12 6.37 6.78 7.1 
ITALY 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Austrian banks 2.64 2.19 2.04 1.61 2.23 2.58 2.2 
Belgian banks 10.85 8.09 4.38 4.74 2.83 2.99 5.6 
Finnish banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.0 
French banks 18.94 27.45 37.66 42.79 44.44 45.53 36.1 
German banks 25.26 20.10 19.41 18.91 16.60 18.82 19.9 
Greek banks 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.1 
Irish banks 0.00 5.20 3.94 4.25 3.99 1.53 3.2 
Dutch banks 10.84 13.82 11.65 6.11 6.04 5.26 9.0 
Portuguese banks 0.76 0.75 0.41 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.5 
Spanish banks 4.44 2.99 2.82 4.44 4.13 3.62 3.7 
British banks 9.22 7.02 7.09 6.83 6.71 7.70 7.4 
US banks 5.78 3.25 2.79 2.33 4.66 4.26 3.8 
Others 11.12 9.08 7.78 7.65 7.84 7.21 8.4 
Note: Table 8 displays the consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis of Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) by nationality of reporting banks as a proportion of total foreign claims on each country. Data correspond to the 
end of each year.  
Source: This table has been constructed from data collected from Table 9D of BIS Quarterly Review: June 2011. 
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Table 9: Probit models 
Greece → Ireland 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
GRIEBAN 16.2492 2.7521 
GRGOVDEB -0.0521 -2.2643 
UGR 0.7388 2.1374 
DEFIE 0.1064 2.0586 
IEBAN -0.0325 -2.2617 
IEPRI 0.0211 2.1911 
GRBANDEB 0.1257 2.3125 
McFadden R-squared 0.7413   
 
 Ireland → Greece 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -2.8012 -2.0634 
IEGRBAN 91.6240 2.9967 
IEPUB 1.2065 2.9655 
DEFIE 0.0926 2.2747 
McFadden R-squared 0.7198   
 
Greece → Italy 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant 14.0900 2.2549 
GRITBAN 0.21393 2.2850 
INFGR 0.4900 2.1984 
UGR 2.0301 3.3365 
RATGR 1.9055 2.1252 
GRGOVDEB 0.2932 2.2038 
McFadden R-squared 0.8105   
 
Italy → Greece  
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant 22.3885 2.8110 
ITGRBAN 0.8811 2.5241 
DEFIT 0.6796 3.9229 
ITBANDEB 0.1942 3.2798 
URIT 4.0351 3.7468 
RATGRE 1.1494 2.8010 
ITPUB 0.0494 2.6652 
ITHOUDEB 1.7672 2.9852 
McFadden R-squared 0.7365   
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 Greece → Portugal 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Contant -3.1133 -2.1357 
GRPTBAN 53.5999 2.5940 
INFGR 2.3869 2.1412 
UGR 7.7531 2.7749 
GRGOVDEB 0.8771 3.4462 
VARRATPT 5.8638 3.9751 
GRNFIDEB 1.1808 3.9503 
GRPUB 1.6704 2.6380 
GRPRI 0.8294 3.4910 
McFadden R-squared 0.8474   
 
 
 Portugal → Greece 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -96.3741 -4.2545 
PTGRBAN 5.9734 3.3352 
INFPT 3.2890 3.9156 
UPT 8.1793 4.2537 
DEFPT 0.3027 2.3217 
PTNFIDEB 1.3158 2.7293 
PTPUB 0.5964 2.3633 
PTBANDEB 0.9296 2.6373 
McFadden R-squared 0.7386   
 
Greece → Spain 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -6.2095 -1.4073 
GRSPBAN 7.2864 2.4876 
UGR 4.1365 5.5873 
GRGOVDEB 0.3101 4.3304 
DEFSP 0.2693 2.5897 
McFadden R-squared 0.8125   
 
 
Spain → Greece 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -99.4167 -4.1675 
SPGRBAN 33.1269 3.9718 
SPBANDEB 0.3791 2.5198 
SPANFIDEB 0.1302 2.4135 
RATGR 1.3577 2.6305 
RATSP 5.6458 2.6104 
CACSP 1.1596 2.4870 
SPPUB 10.1523 3.2375 
McFadden R-squared 0.7093   
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Spain → Portugal 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -40.6506 -2.8468 
SPPTBAN 6.9212 2.1449 
SPNFIDEB 2.6210 3.2914 
UPOR 3.1901 2.7406 
McFadden R-squared 0.6611   
 
 
 Portugal → Spain 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
PTSPBAN 12.1144 2.5430 
DEFPT 0.3725 2.1648 
GROPT -13.9959 -2.6106 
INFPT -6.6052 -2.3755 
VARRATPT 0.2782 2.2489 
GROSP 12.8877 2.6820 
SPGOVDEB -1.1445 -2.5831 
McFadden R-squared 0.8088   
 
Spain → Italy 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -11.8675 2.1670 
SPITBAN 0.2741 2.6442 
DEFSP 0.1581 2.7266 
USP 0.2012 2.1985 
SPGOVDEB 0.1813 2.3653 
CACSP -0.1115 -2.3400 
UIT 0.1168 2.1243 
ITPUB 0.6969 3.3779 
RATIT 0.3399 2.5867 
McFadden R-squared 0.6246   
 
 
Italy → Spain  
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -36.0502 -2.3662 
ITSPBAN 3.1718 2.1135 
DEFIT 0.5437 2.8247 
ITBANDEB 0.2590 2.8595 
RATSP 17.8700 3.0272 
ITGOVDEB 0.1312 2.5231 
UIT 8.0025 2.8793 
McFadden R-squared 0.7496   
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Italy → Ireland 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant 21.7423 2.3740 
ITIEBAN 3.0855 3.5476 
DEFIT 0.0392 2.3489 
ITBANDEB 0.0343 2.8695 
UIT 1.9383 3.9144 
RATIE 0.5681 4.2812 
ITHOUDEB 0.7421 2.8408 
ITGOVDEB 0.4103 3.6599 
McFadden R-squared 0.6470   
 
 
 Ireland → Italy 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -34.7139 -3.7590 
IEITBAN 0.0110 2.0619 
IEPUB 4.9328 3.8503 
DEFIE 0.3727 3.0778 
INFIE 1.6927 3.5820 
McFadden R-squared 0.8173   
 
Portugal → Ireland 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -52.0783 -3.5789 
PTIEBAN 1.0286 3.8186 
DEFPT 0.4460 5.0346 
UPT 5.5694 4.1245 
INFPT 1.6688 2.2816 
RATPT 0.8951 2.6585 
UIE 0.3554 2.6639 
IEGOVDEB 0.0715 2.8254 
McFadden R-squared 0.7412   
 
 
Ireland → Portugal 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -53.9995 -4.7011 
IEPTBAN 0.9309 2.8166 
IEPUB 0.2234 2.3844 
DEFIE 0.4235 4.3270 
UIE 5.4868 4.1534 
IEBAN 0.0030 2.1760 
IEGOVDEB 1.4048 3.4880 
UPT 0.1068 2.1824 
CACPT -3.3297 -4.5435 
McFadden R-squared 0.8257   
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Spain → Ireland 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -30.2923 -2.5886 
SPIEBAN 6.5169 2.3238 
DEFSP 0.0716 2.8099 
USP 3.0126 3.2156 
SPBAN 0.3619 2.5362 
SPGOVDEB 0.6502 3.0083 
CACSP -1.2045 -2.4112 
UIE 0.7980 3.4112 
SPBANDEB 0.0729 2.5343 
McFadden R-squared 0.7002   
 
 
 Ireland → Spain 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -4.4028 -2.6272 
IESPBAN 0.3133 2.6764 
IEPUB 1.7950 3.1077 
DEFIE 0.4638 3.2044 
IEBAN 0.0749 3.1281 
IEGOVDEB 1.0637 3.1027 
USP 2.2242 2.9601 
McFadden R-squared 0.7045   
 
Portugal → Italy 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant -59.3698 -4.0692 
PTITBAN 4.8112 2.4425 
DEFPT 0.4549 2.2626 
UPT 2.5365 2.1736 
RATPT 7.2804 3.9456 
UIT 2.5939 3.0013 
PTPUB 1.8024 4.2752 
RATIT 1.0716 2.6486 
PTGOVDEB 0.7401 3.3067 
McFadden R-squared 0.5595   
 
Italy → Portugal 
  Coefficient z-Statistic 
Constant 28.0712 2.0045 
ITPTBAN 6.8975 3.3487 
DEFIT 0.6021 2.5329 
UIT 3.5979 2.8359 
UPT 5.7698 2.7683 
ITHOUDEB 2.7336 3.2757 
RATIT 1.3327 2.1908 
ITGOVDEB 1.3677 3.2470 
McFadden R-squared 0.7383   
 
 
Notes: 
CACXX = Current-account-balance-to-GDP of country XX 
UXX = Unemployment rate of country XX 
INFXX = Inflation rate of country XX 
RATXX = Credit rating scale of country XX. 
DEFXX = Government deficit-to-GDP of country XX. 
XXGOVDEB = Government debt-to-GDP of country XX. 
XXBANDEB = Bank debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXNFIDEB = Non-financial corporations debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXHOUDEB = Households debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXBAN = Foreign bank claims on banks debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXPUB = Foreign bank claims on government debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXPRI = Foreign bank claims on non-financial private debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXYYBAN = Percentage of country XX’s foreign claims held by country YY’s banks 
 
